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This chapter examines whether and how government can learn from the ombudsman. 
Ombudsman schemes frequently claim that their work has an impact on government and some 
scholars have been enthusiastic about the potential contribution of the ombudsman in this regard. 
However, there remains significant controversy over the extent to which the ombudsman should 
be helping government to learn. Pragmatically, it seems self-evident that errors picked up by the 
ombudsman in the course of investigations should not be allowed to recur. Matters become 
contested, however, where the ombudsman takes on a more proactive role and seeks actively to 
influence government, through mechanisms including systemic investigations, providing 
guidance, giving advice, and delivering training. Indeed, where an ombudsman becomes more 
directive in seeking to influence government, questions of constitutional propriety arise around 
checks and balances on the ombudsman’s activities. There is a concern here that, by taking on a 
more directive and managerial role within the administrative process, the ombudsman may be 
usurping the proper role of government administrators. A starting point for discussing the 
ombudsman’s role in relation to helping government learn, therefore, is to recognize that the role 
is contested and that its proper limits remain a matter for debate. 
 It is probably uncontroversial to accept that the ombudsman has at least some role in 
promoting governmental learning (however limited and delineated). Indeed, ombudsman 
scholarship has been dominated by discussion of the potential for the ombudsman to fulfill a 
more dynamic role in relation to government, whether that is characterized as ‘fire-watching’ 
(Harlow and Rawlings 2009), ‘fire-prevention’ (Abrahams 2012), or ‘control’ (Heede 2000). In 
this regard, scholars have identified a number of assets and liabilities that the ombudsman 
institution possesses in relation to generating learning within government. Assets include strong 
powers of investigation, the ability to make recommendations, and the ability to consider aspects 
of the administrative process untouched by the courts. Liabilities include questions over whether 
pragmatism trumps principle in ombudsman decisions, whether modern complaints management 
techniques lead to a loss of learning, and whether the closeness to government required to help it 
learn may lead to a form of regulatory capture. The question of the ombudsman’s theoretical 
potential to help government learn is complicated, of course, by the fact that assets and liabilities 
vary significantly between ombudsman schemes and between national jurisdictions. The 
fabulous variety of the ombudsman institution around the world, and its ability to be grafted into 
vastly different legal and political systems, is considered to be part of the genius of the institution 
Reif 2004). However, this makes generalization on a global scale all but impossible.1 
 There is also significant variation in the aspects of government overseen by the 
ombudsman. Some ombudsman schemes oversee local government, others central government, 
                                               
1 For this reason, this chapter – while seeking to bring out some of the inherent, cross-cutting difficulties in 
assessing the ombudsman’s learning role – does not attempt to provide a holistic overview, applicable across the 
world. Instead, the literature reviewed and the predominant focus of the chapter is on the ombudsman institution as 
it operates in Western states. 
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while some consider specialized agencies such as the military or the police. The scope of 
ombudsman schemes also differs, with some having a maladministration focus, some 
considering human rights, some having criminal anti-corruption powers, and others still taking 
on functions as auditors, inspectors, and regulators. When one also considers the varying ways in 
which government is administered across the world, we are faced with an almost infinitely 
variable set of combinations: different ombudsman schemes overseeing different administrative 
settings in different jurisdictions. More generally, considering the nature of government 
administration is a matter which has often been overlooked in debates about whether the 
ombudsman either should or can help government to learn. These discussions have had a ‘top-
down’ emphasis on the perceived qualities of the ombudsman institution and have often had very 
little regard for the realities of the government bureaucracies which the ombudsman oversees. 
Indeed, whether government learns is as much, if not more, a matter of how government 
functions as it is a matter of the particular approach, powers, and functions of the ombudsman. 
Here, the literature in the fields of public administration and organizational science has tended to 
be pessimistic with regard to the potential for achieving learning and directed change in 
government. 
 This chapter explores these issues and is structured in five parts. Firstly, it will consider 
literature examining the significant challenges around controlling government action, drawing on 
scholarship concerned with bureaucratic control, policy implementation, decision-making, and 
organizational learning. Secondly, the chapter will consider normative arguments around the 
ombudsman’s role and the debate around how far the ombudsman should be involved in helping 
government learn. Thirdly, the theoretical assets and liabilities of the ombudsman in terms of 
whether it can help government learn will be examined. Fourthly, the chapter will present two 
case studies, showing contrasting approaches which ombudsman schemes have taken to assisting 
governmental learning. Finally, the chapter will turn to examine the limited empirical studies that 
have investigated bureaucratic responses to the ombudsman and consider the challenges around 
improving our empirical understanding in this area. 
 
 
II. LEARNING WITHIN GOVERNEMNT ORGANIZATIONS: REASONS TO 
BE SKEPTICAL 
 
Accountability mechanisms, such as the ombudsman, have been seen to fulfil three goals: a 
democratic goal (checking that the will of political principals is done); a constitutional goal 
(uncovering and fixing abuses of power); and a learning goal (promoting improvement in 
government) (Bovens et al 2008). While the first two goals have traditionally been at the heart of 
the mission of accountability mechanisms, there has been increasing emphasis on harnessing the 
work of accountability mechanisms to help government learn (Aucoin and Heintzman 2000). 
The growth in importance of learning and improvement has partly been driven by the New 
Public Management (NPM) reforms that have been a hallmark of most Western democratic 
states over the past thirty years (Hood and Dixon 2015). This has involved, amongst other things, 
a disaggregation of the policy making and policy delivery functions of government, with 
problems of imperfect control compensated for in part by the expansion of internal 
accountability mechanisms within government (Hood et al 2000). Importantly, the NPM reforms 
emphasized a particularly instrumental view of accountability mechanisms, where improved 
managerial performance and an emphasis on improving the quality of bureaucratic outputs came 
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to be seen as increasingly important. It is perhaps not surprising, in this context, that scholars 
have noticed an increasing trend towards the ombudsman seeking to influence government action 
and help it to learn (Buck et al 2011). 
 However, concurrently with this developing emphasis on learning as a goal of 
accountability, a substantial literature has developed in the fields of public administration and 
organisational science, which suggests that achieving directed change in government is a 
particularly challenging task. Some of the earliest studies of policy implementation, for example, 
highlighted multiple barriers to policymakers making their policies a reality and these findings 
have tended to be confirmed in study after study in the last half century, to the extent that studies 
of implementation have been dubbed ‘misery research’ (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; 
Rothstein 1998). A particular focus of so called ‘bottom up’ implementation research has been 
on investigating the influence of frontline bureaucrats, who are seen as resistant to control and 
hugely powerful actors in terms of the policy implementation process (Alden 2015). These 
bureaucrats have been portrayed as shaping the reality of policy on the ground, with David 
Lipsky famously concluding that: ‘The decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they 
establish and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively 
become the public policies they carry out.’ (1980, xii) 
 The difficulty of controlling bureaucratic actors has also been studied in literature 
concerned with the control of government, which is centrally informed by principal agent theory. 
This theory examines the implications of delegated authority, where the principal is seen as 
entering into a contract with an agent, who is entrusted to carry out the specified wishes of the 
principal (Gormley and Balla 2004). Principal-agent theory identifies two problems wherever 
power is delegated: it is difficult, ahead of time, to know whether the agent entrusted with a task 
has the capacity to perform it (adverse selection); and it can be very difficult to monitor 
subsequently how the agent is performing in practice (moral hazard). Any delegation is seen to 
involve ‘agency loss’ where the capacity of the principal to achieve their goals is limited by 
adverse selection and moral hazard (ibid.). The literature on the control of government tends to 
counsel realism in relation to the extent that bureaucratic agents can be controlled by their 
principals, whether these are external or internal to the organisation (Hood 1995; Beck Jorgensen 
and Vranbaek 2011).  Systems of control are seen as imperfect, because they do not have the 
requisite variety to match the complexity of modern bureaucratic systems. Principals who seek 
control over their bureaucratic agents require clear directions, an effective method of detecting 
error, and an effective means of correcting error. However, because any system of control is only 
as good as its weakest element and since principals are often ambiguous in their directions, have 
insufficient data about what is happening in government administration, and are restricted in 
their abilities to coerce other actors, there are serious limitations on the achievement of 
bureaucratic control (Dunsire 1992).   
Other literature which is relevant to the discussion here includes empirical work which 
has sought to explore the extent to which courts control bureaucratic action (Hertogh and 
Halliday 2004). These studies have generally found that the courts struggle to assert their values 
within the ‘administrative soup’ of rival influences (Sunkin 2004). Other literature concerned 
with analysing fairness in bureaucratic decision-making also suggests that bureaucracies are 
highly competitive normative environments, in which rival conceptions of fairness struggle for 
dominance (Mashaw 1983; Adler 2010). Here the extent to which government decision-making 
can be made subject to external control has been treated with significant scepticism, with some 
concluding that the ‘natural hegemony’ of bureaucratic approaches tends to edge out ideas of 
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individual fair treatment (Galligan 1996). This echoes work on NPM, which identifies three key 
types of bureaucratic values: sigma values (‘keep it lean and purposeful’), theta values (‘keep it 
honest and fair’) and lambda values (‘keep it robust and resilient’) (Hood 1991). NPM’s concern 
with frugality and efficiency means that bureaucracies have increasingly tended to shift towards 
the adoption of sigma type values. The extent to which internal or external mechanisms of 
control and accountability are likely to be effective, therefore, is at least partly down to the 
normative characters of the bureaucratic environment in question. Indeed, a conclusion from this 
chapter so far is that the characteristics of the system subject to control are likely to be as 
important as the characteristics of the mechanisms seeking to exercise control. 
Our concern in this chapter, however, is not simply on whether mechanisms of 
accountability are able to exert control, but on whether they are able to bring about learning in 
government. This is a broader notion, which calls for a ‘bottom up’ perspective on the 
organisational processes through which people in organisations respond to experience (from both 
internal and external sources) and change their cognition and behaviour (Argyris and Schon 
1978). The primary conclusion of literature in the field of organisational learning is that 
organisations tend to be ineffective at learning, with long lists of barriers to effective learning 
including issues around capacity, organisational commitment, and resources.  Indeed, 
organisations tend not only to be bad at learning, but actually create routines which are designed 
to avoid the feelings of vulnerability associated with learning: ‘Organisations deliberately create 
self-reinforcing, anti-learning processes to overprotect the actors to make sure that they are 
protected from difficult and embarrassing problems. Such routines are eventually taken for 
granted.’ (ibid., 7).  
These pathologies of anti-learning are likely to be exacerbated in the context of 
government organisations (Common 2004; Thomas 2015). These problems include election 
cycles which can disrupt learning continuity, poor quality legislation, and a blame environment 
which discourages risk taking (Gilson et al 2009). In the public sector context, NPM reforms 
have severely limited the capacity of organisations not only to learn in the first place, but to 
remember what they have learnt (Pollitt 2009). A common suggestion in this literature is that 
government organisations tend to be incapable of ‘double-loop’ learning (where fundamental 
values, approaches, and processes are re-evaluated) and instead, where learning occurs, it tends 
to be ‘single loop’ (where the focus is on making existing processes work more efficiently, 
without challenging the basic values underlying them) (Argyris and Schon 1978; Thomas 2015). 
This is seen as a problematic, since many challenges faced by government are ‘double-loop’ in 
nature, yet are dealt with in a short-term, problem-solving, ‘single loop’ fashion (Leeuw and 
Sonnichsen 1994). Where the learning stimulus comes from outwith the organisation, learning 
has also been thought to involve particular challenges since organisational boundaries can be 
hard to penetrate, with some suggesting a natural tendency for organisations to become 
unresponsive to their external environments (Von Acker et al 2015). Here, organisations tend 
only to respond with positive learning routines where external stimuli are consistent with their 
existing frames of reference; where they are not, the chances of them permeating organisational 
boundaries are reduced. 
In summary, therefore, the literature surveyed above suggests that the starting point for 
considering the role of the ombudsman in helping government to learn is to be sanguine about 
the significant challenges inherent in bringing about learning and directed change in complex 
bureaucracies. This starting point is seen as an important corrective to existing literature on the 
ombudsman, which has tended to focus mainly on the theoretical characteristics of the 
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ombudsman rather than the reality of the bureaucratic organisations they oversee. Having set out 
this baseline, the chapter now turns to examine literature specifically concerned with the 
ombudsman’s role in helping government to learn. 
 
 
III. SHOULD THE OMBUDSMAN HELP GOVERNMENT TO LEARN: A 
CONTESTED ROLE  
 
Before one can evaluate the success of the ombudsman institution, one must understand its core 
purpose and functions (Seneviratne 2002). However, a recurring theme in ombudsman 
scholarship has been to question what the ombudsman should be doing. Much of this debate has 
been concerned with normative arguments around whether the ombudsman should be concerned 
primarily with righting individual injustice (redress) or with proactively seeking to bring about 
bureaucratic improvement (control) (Heede 2000)? A number of other metaphors have been used 
to characterise these different roles, including ‘fire-fighting’, ‘fire-watching’ and ‘fire-
preventing’ (see Harlow and Rawlings 2009; Abrahams 2012). Proponents of the control 
approach argue that key features of the ombudsman – its inquisitorial approach, its concern with 
the quality of the administrative process, its ability to make and follow up recommendations – 
make it well suited to helping bureaucrats learn (Harlow 1978; Lewis and Birkinshaw 1993). In 
this view, an excessive focus on individual complaints turns the ombudsman into a small claims 
court, with a limited and consumerist focus on redress rather than a broader role in relation to 
facilitating deliberative democracy and citizen participation in the processes of government 
(O’Brien 2015). Here, the specific contribution of the ombudsman to the administrative justice 
system is its ability to audit administrative processes and bring about systemic change (Harlow 
1978). Concern has been expressed, however, that if the ombudsman lays too much emphasis on 
ex ante measures to improve and control public administration, this will lead to a loss of focus on 
the individual citizen (Stuhmcke 2012). There is also concern that techniques associated with the 
‘fire-watching’ approach – such as investigations launched at an ombudsman’s own initiative 
rather than following a complaint – can reduce the legitimacy of the ombudsman and risks 
politicizing the institution. Nonetheless, a key trend in the literature has been to suggest that 
ombudsman schemes are increasingly prioritizing fire-watching approaches, although different 
ombudsman schemes continue take different approaches, ranging from ‘reactive’ to ‘proactive’ 
(ibid.).  
The proper role of the ombudsman is also a matter of constitutional importance, since the 
‘fire-fighting’ and ‘fire-watching’ approaches each have different implications in relation to the 
constitutional positioning of the ombudsman and their relationships with other state actors. An 
aggressively fire-watching approach, for example, where individual complaints are used largely 
as intelligence for launching large scale systemic audits of administrative practice, might be seen 
to overlap with the functions of existing scrutiny bodies such as auditors and inspectors. It might 
also lead to a change in emphasis on protecting the individual citizen and providing a route for 
the individual’s voice to reach the ears of those in power (Stuhmcke 2010). On the other hand, a 
reactive approach overly focused on fire-fighting and the provision of individual redress might 
be seen to duplicate the work of other redress mechanisms such as courts and tribunals and to fail 
to make a clear additional contribution to the administrative justice system.  
Indeed, while there is widespread agreement that ombudsman schemes have become a 
valuable part of the constitution, the notion of the ombudsman as a ‘constitutional misfit’ retains 
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some purchase (Snell 2000). Scholars have traditionally emphasised the parliamentary role of the 
ombudsman, with it acting as an adjunct of parliament and a support to the legislature’s scrutiny 
of government action (Giddings 2008). Here ombudsman schemes have been categorised as: 
‘…as auxiliary mechanisms to aid political principals to oversee their administrative agents.’ 
(Von Acker et al 2015, p. 40) 
Others have seen the ombudsman as performing a more hybrid function, stressing not 
only its relationship to parliament but seeing it as a supplement to traditional administrative law 
remedies available in courts and tribunals (Maggette 2003). In this view, the ombudsman spans 
political and legal forms of redress. A third view, influenced by developments in Australia, has 
argued that the ombudsman should be seen as part of a developing branch of government styled 
as the ‘integrity branch’ which includes auditors, regulators, inspectors and other bodies 
concerned with probity in public administration (Buck et al 2011). Thus, the argument here is 
that the debate over the role of the ombudsman needs to be considered not only in terms of 
whether they are suited to task of helping government learn, but also in terms of how such a role 
aligns with the constitutional position of the ombudsman. The question is a fundamental one 
with regard to the constitutional source of the ombudsman’s legitimacy. Recent developments in 
Australia and Scotland have, for example, raised concerns that ombudsman schemes have been 
given additional functions (in relation to audit and the regulation of complaint handling) which 
have the potential to cloud their impartiality and blur the boundary between the ombudsman and 
the executive (Gill 2014). Indeed, in suggesting that the ombudsman should have a stronger role 
in shaping administrative action and in helping one of the parties to improve, there is a danger 
that the ombudsman might put its impartiality at risk.  
Several important points arise from this discussion. The first is that the legitimacy of the 
ombudsman’s attempts to influence bureaucratic practice is contested. There are good arguments 
for the ombudsman to concentrate on providing redress for individual citizens and some 
potentially troubling constitutional implications in relation to the ombudsman proactively 
helping government to learn. The second point arises from the first: if there is a question mark 
over the constitutional propriety of the ombudsman’s attempts to influence bureaucratic practice 
then this may limit its effectiveness in doing so. An absence of clarity around the ombudsman’s 
roles and the constitutional legitimacy of its actions may hinder any attempts to ensure that 
learning occurs as a result of its work by increasing bureaucratic resistance. The third point is 
that there is a significant spectrum amongst ombudsman schemes in relation to how they 
interpret their roles and whether they prioritize redress or control. Some take a more reactive 
stance while others are more proactive – as a result, the extent to which we may expect learning 
to take place is likely to vary significantly depending on how ombudsman schemes see their core 
function. More generally, this discussion highlights the importance of approaching the empirical 
question of whether government learns from the ombudsman with a clear understanding of the 
uncertainty and variability of the ombudsman’s role. While few would argue that ombudsman 
schemes should have no role in relation to helping government to learn, there is significant 




IV. CAN THE OMBUDSMAN HELP GOVERNMENT TO LEARN: 




Having considered the normative issues surrounding the ombudsman’s learning role, this section 
reviews the theoretical arguments about whether the ombudsman is in a position to help 
government to learn. Can the ombudsman fulfill such a role? The ombudsman has both assets 
and liabilities in this regard and these are summarized in the table below.2 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Figure 18.1: potential assets and liabilities in relation to the ombudsman’s learning role 
 
Beginning with the ombudsman’s institutional assets, ombudsman scholars have generally been 
fairly positive about the potential for the ombudsman to influence bureaucratic action. Kirkham 
(2006), for example, highlights the inquisitorial approach of ombudsman schemes as facilitating 
the kind of intense scrutiny likely to lead to administrative improvement. The ombudsman’s 
ability to make recommendations is considered as a strength of the institution (Gregory and 
Drewry 1991). These powers distinguish the ombudsman from the adversarial and reactive 
approach of the courts and give the institution much more scope to examine the administrative 
process and to identify areas for improvement (Seneviratne 2002). Other aspects of the 
ombudsman’s procedural approach, such as its ability to develop close and collaborative 
relationships with administrators and to enter policy networks, are often cited as strengths (Van 
de Pol 2009). The fact that the ombudsman is able to build relationships, and enter into 
continuous dialogue, with the bodies it investigates has been argued to provide a strong basis for 
the receipt of guidance and advice by administrators (Farrand 1999). This is particularly the case 
for local ombudsman schemes, which are able to develop more direct and personal relationships 
with administrators (Van de Pol 2009). Indeed, the ability of the ombudsman to act both as an 
adjudicator and as an influential policy actor is seen as a potential strength of the institution, 
which makes it better suited for dealing with the complex polycentric problems of resource 
allocation which are often at the heart of citizens’ grievances (King 2012). 
The nature of the ombudsman’s jurisdiction has also been perceived as a strength in 
relation to helping officials to learn. Indeed, it is clear that the concept of maladministration 
allows ombudsman schemes to go much further in probing bureaucratic action than does the 
legal conception of good administration (Steyvers and Reynart 2009). That ombudsman schemes 
are able to consider a broader range of bureaucratic behaviour is, therefore, considered as 
potentially enhancing their ability to identify problems since they are able to look at a wide range 
of administrative matters. The ability to publish annual reports and issue guidance is also cited as 
an advantage in relation to shaping future bureaucratic action (ibid.). Indeed, the development in 
the UK of principles of good administration has been noted as a major development in relation to 
providing guidance to administrators (Kirkham 2007). Own initiative powers of investigation – 
where an investigation can be launched without receipt of a complaint – are suggested as 
particularly helpful in relation to identifying areas of weakness where government requires to 
improve (Buck et al 2011). The use of publicity and the media as a tool to help secure 
compliance and provide a complement to the ombudsman’s moral authority, are considered to be 
effective in relation to ensuring that government accepts recommendations (O’Reilly 2009). 
More generally, some ombudsman schemes have argued that their very existence exerts an 
influence on administrative practice which, although it cannot be measured, should be not 
ignored. One former ombudsman referred to this as a ‘tonic effect’ (Compton 1970).  
                                               
2 The terms assets and liabilities are borrowed from Steyvers and Reynart (2009).   
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 A number of liabilities have, however, been suggested in relation to the extent to which 
the ombudsman can fulfil a role in helping government learn. One issue is the increasing trend 
for ombudsman schemes to use informal resolution methods rather than the ‘Rolls Royce’ 
administrative audit style investigations that used to characterise the institution (Bondy et al 
2014). The key idea behind ‘modern complaints management’ is that quick resolutions to 
complaints are proposed without finding out what went wrong or why (Cabinet Office 2000). 
From a learning perspective, the risk is clearly that a focus on individual satisfaction and a 
superficial treatment of cases militates against the intense scrutiny of processes provided by 
more formal investigations. This will also tend to reinforce a problem-solving or single-loop 
approach, where only presenting issues are addressed at the expense of more fundamental 
change. Indeed, Kirkham (2005) has noted that some have criticised the ‘local settlement’ 
process used by some ombudsman schemes because it could be used by organisations to shield 
themselves from more probing investigation.  
A major limitation highlighted by those who consider that the ombudsman should 
primarily be a fire-watcher is the absence of own initiative powers of investigation in some 
schemes. As some have pointed out, ombudsman recommendations can often be dismissed by 
administrators on a ‘damage score argument’, where complaints are seen as representing a small 
sample of unrepresentative cases (Steyvers and Reynart 2009). More generally, while 
compliance with ombudsman decisions and recommendations generally appears to be good, it is 
not perfect. In the UK, some have noted with concern a tendency by government departments to 
push back on ombudsman recommendations (Kirkham et al 2008). Others have suggested that 
the ombudsman’s reliance on the goodwill of those investigated is problematic, especially where 
there is an absence of parliamentary support for the office (Lewis and Birkinshaw 1993). While 
the idea that the ombudsman’s closeness to, and good relationships with, administrators suggests 
that it will be able to exert influence over them more effectively, there is also a danger that this 
closeness will lead to the ombudsman becoming ‘captured’ by the bureaucrats it is meant to 
oversee (King 2012). 
A further issue relates to the ombudsman’s ability to develop coherent standards to guide 
the behaviour of public bodies. While the maladministration standard is broader than good 
administration in law, its exact meaning is ‘notoriously uncertain’ (Kirkham 2006). While the 
development of ‘principles’ (PHSO 2009) and ‘axioms’ (LGO 1993) of good administration is a 
step forward, there remains uncertainty about the extent to which pragmatism or principle 
predominate in the decision-making of ombudsman schemes (Gill et al 2013). Indeed, it has been 
noted that in their attempts to secure redress for individuals, ombudsman schemes often fudge 
matters of principle; this has been referred to as a matter of reaching a ‘balanced 
accommodation’ between principles of good administration and the realities of bureaucratic 
practice (Seneviratne 2002). Recent literature examining the development of ‘ombudsnorms’ has 
noted that published ombudsman decisions do not often refer to the standards being used and do 
not, therefore, demonstrate the connections that may be made between the particular facts of the 
case and the general principle that may be drawn from it (Remac 2013). There is, therefore, a 
question mark over what may be learned from the ombudsman in terms of substantive and 
transferable principle. 
More pragmatically, some have questioned the effectiveness of external measures to 
improve bureaucratic practice and noted the potential for defensive behaviour rather than 
improvement on the part of bureaucrats as result of the ombudsman’s work (Adler 2003). This 
has been a frequent charge levelled at accountability mechanisms and has been referred to as the 
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accountability paradox, whereby accountability does not necessarily lead to improved 
performance (Bovens et al 2008). Others have talked of an accountability trap, where institutions 
get better at meeting the requirements of accountability mechanisms, while taking their eyes off 
improvements in service delivery (ibid.). The potential pathologies that may arise from 
bureaucratic responses to oversight include: tunnel vision, ritualization, mutual stereotyping, 
defensive routines, and hostile behavior (ibid.). Some have criticized the way accountability 
mechanisms lead to a loss of agency and moral judgment by organisational actors, undermining 
the development of learning and self-reflection (Jos and Tompkins 2004). The potential for 
defensive approaches in response to accountability mechanisms has been seen as especially 
prevalent where issues arise from individual experiences, where the evidence base for 
recommended actions and changes can be seen to lack legitimacy (Van de Pol 2009). Some 
administrative justice scholars have argued that – given the challenges of seeking to influence 
bureaucratic practice from the outside, the focus ought to be on internal improvement and 




V. CASE STUDIES: TWO CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO HELPING 
GOVERNMENT LEARN  
 
Having considered the normative and theoretical debates surrounding the ombudsman’s learning 
role, this section presents two case studies which highlight contrasting approaches which 
ombudsman schemes are taking to helping government to learn. These serve to illustrate some of 
the issues discussed so far in this chapter. 
 
The Scottish Public Services Ombudsman – the ombudsman as quasi-regulator 
 
The Scottish Public Services Ombudsman has traditionally been seen as having a fire-fighting 
orientation (Thompson 2006). However, since the office was granted new powers to oversee the 
simplification and standardisation of public service complaints processes in 2010, the 
organisation has shifted to a much more proactive ombudsman model (Gill 2014). The 
ombudsman’s new role includes: 
 monitoring practice and identifying trends in complaint handling, 
 promoting best practice in relation to such complaint handling,  
 encouraging co-operation and the sharing of best practice among public bodies, 
 publishing model complaint processes, 
 issuing statements of non-compliance where a public body does not comply with a model 
complaint process. 
These new functions have been described as a ‘design authority’ role (Scottish Government 
2008).  In practice, the SPSO has created a small internal unit within the organisation called the 
Complaints Standards Authority (CSA).  The SPSO’s latest annual report highlights the range of 
activities conducted by the CSA: the facilitation of professional complaint handling networks, 
the provision of training, the creation of e-learning modules on complaint handling, the 
development of collaborative monitoring arrangements with audit and regulatory bodies, and the 
development of standardised performance indicators.  In relation to the latter, each model 
complaints process contains suggested performance indicators and requires the publication of 
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complaints data. These indicators include: statistical information on complaints received and 
resolved at various stages of the process; a statement outlining improvements to services as a 
result of a complaint; and a measure to assess customer satisfaction with the complaints service 
provided. In addition, the SPSO has recently received additional project funding to set up a 
Learning and Improvement Unit (LIU), whose role is to work collaboratively with organisations 
subject to significant complaints in order to help them improve. The LIU was described in the 
SPSO’s annual report as a significant development in the ombudsman’s role: ‘…going beyond 
how complaints are handled to the heart of how authorities can use learning from them to bring 
about genuine and long-lasting change.’(SPSO 2016, 5).  
This role involves providing advice and support to organisations generating high volumes 
of complaint to support improvement initiatives and assist with the implementation of 
recommendations. 
 As may be clear, the SPSO’s new powers involve a significant increase in the work 
undertaken by the ombudsman outwith the investigation of complaints. While the latter remains 
the core business of the organisation and while the bulk of the ombudsman’s staff remain 
involved in these activities, this has now been complemented by a range of quasi-regulatory 
activities such as standard setting and performance monitoring. The approach adopted by the 
SPSO emphasises collaboration with stakeholders and a key element of recent changes has been 
the convening of complaint handling networks, which are used to develop improved complaint 
handling practice. While the focus of the SPSO’s improvement work to date has very much been 
on complaint handling (rather than substantive administration) (Gill 2012), there are now signs 
that its ambitions are growing with the creation of the LIU. The latter appears to involve a move 
beyond the quasi-regulatory approach of the CSA, towards a consultancy and advice model, 
which involves more prolonged engagement with particular organisations. While the SPSO has 
strongly advocated its model of ombudsmanry to other ombudsman schemes, the approach has 
remained low key and consensual in terms of how relationships with bodies under jurisdiction 
are managed. For example, the SPSO has to date made only limited use of thematic 
investigations and has not adopted particularly systemic approaches to casework investigation.  
There have yet to be any formal evaluations of these recent developments, but the 
SPSO’s approach highlights several of the potential assets and liabilities discussed above. 
Potential assets include the development of close, collaborative relationships with bodies under 
jurisdiction, using the ombudsman’s ability to operate as a policy actor to influence 
administrative practice. A further asset relates to the increased focus on developing clear 
normative guidance for bureaucrats, setting authoritative standards around complaint handling. 
Potential liabilities in part arise from these potential assets: the closeness of the ombudsman to 
those under investigation may, in time, raise questions about the office’s impartiality. A certain 
amount of constitutional blurring is also in evidence here, as the ombudsman begins to work as a 
consultant with poor performing authorities. It is presumably only a matter of time before the 
ombudsman is called upon to determine a complaint with regard to systems, policies, processes, 
or practices that have arisen following the provision of the LIU’s consultancy and advice service. 
While this more interventionist approach is a strong potential asset in helping to prompt learning, 
there is a question over whether this managerial model oversteps the mark and usurps the proper 
functions of administrators. 
 




The Ontario Ombudsman (OO) has developed an international reputation for its systemic 
investigation work. Their approach has its genesis in proposals to abolish the office and a 
perceived need identified by the ombudsman at the time to make a stronger and more obvious 
case for the value of the office (Marin 2009). As a result, the OO’s office has sought consciously 
to differentiate itself from the traditional ombudsman role. Andre Marin, the former ombudsman, 
describes the traditional approach of ombudsman schemes to achieving change in government as 
involving shuttle diplomacy, informal networking, and annual reports (ibid.). This approach is 
described as a complaint resolution model, involving ‘low-level intervention’ and is seen as 
limited for five reasons: shuttle diplomacy relies on good faith on the part of bureaucrats; low 
level intervention is not suited to situations where parties are very litigious or disagree strongly 
on the facts; government priorities are seen as unlikely to change without a significant amount of 
pressure being brought to bear; working quietly in the background does not demonstrate the 
ombudsman’s value to citizens; and a focus on informal resolution means that systemic and 
recurring issues are missed (ibid.). The shift in the OO’s approach has involved moving away 
from what was described as deference and conflict avoidance, to one which is principled and 
seeks to bring issues of good governance firmly to the government’s agenda (ibid.). This is 
described as moving the ombudsman from a complaint department to a service concerned with 
the ‘architecture of governance’ (ibid.) 
 The hallmarks of the OO’s approach are: use of high profile media interventions; robust 
investigation techniques; and the pursuit of broader issues identified as having system wide 
relevance. One of the means through which these hallmarks have been delivered is through the 
creation of a Special Ombudsman Response Team (SORT) to conduct large scale inquiries 
involving face-to-face tape recorded interviews of bureaucrats and research into best practice in 
other jurisdictions (ibid.). Once investigations are complete, the ombudsman requires updates on 
implementation from government bodies, but also goes beyond this by re-investigating the issues 
to ensure that problems have been satisfactorily addressed (ibid.). At each stage of the 
investigation, the media is involved by the ombudsman’s office. Press conferences are convened 
to launch investigations and to publicise outcomes and follow-ups (Jones 2009). Reports are 
given catchy titles, are written in an accessible format, and designed to be easily turned into copy 
by the mainstream press (Dube 2016). Recent examples of systemic investigation reports include 
Careless About Childcare, which contained 113 recommendations for the Ontario Ministry of 
Education and A Matter of Life and Death, which made 22 recommendations in relation to police 
de-escalation techniques (ibid.). In addition to its work in specific cases, the OO has sought to 
establish its approach as a model internationally, partly as a further means of establishing the 
‘added value’ of the office. This has involved the publication of a book outlining the 
ombudsman’s approach to investigation and an international ombudsman training programme 
aimed at popularising the OO’s robust investigation style, called Sharpening Your Teeth (Jones 
2009). 
 How does this approach compare with that of the SPSO? One clear difference is the 
significant emphasis on investigation as the principal means through which learning is achieved 
in government. In some ways this is a more traditional approach than that championed by the 
SPSO, with its use of standard setting and advice outwith cases. It is notable that the OO’s 
training is solely aimed at other administrative watchdogs, while the SPSO’s training unit 
involves the delivery of complaint investigation training to public bodies under its jurisdiction. 
This is suggestive of a very different emphasis, with the OO generally placing itself in a more 
adversarial position in relation to the bodies under its jurisdiction rather than one which provides 
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direct support. This is also indicated through the OO’s use of the media, with investigations 
played out in a very public fashion, whereas the SPSO’s approach emphasises consensus 
building behind the scenes. Another clear difference in approach relates to how the offices 
position themselves in relation to citizens. The OO, in part, uses its robust and high profile 
approach in order to connect with citizens and make them feel that the office is there to represent 
them. The presentation of the office as ‘Ontario’s Watchdog’ and the use of media-friendly 
language in reports is very much designed to bring citizens on board and provide the ombudsman 
with the public support required for cases where government’s feathers will be ruffled. While 
stressing that such approaches actually enhance cooperation in the vast majority of low level 
cases (ibid.), it is quite different from the SPSO’s approach, where work is conducted largely in 
private and few attempts are made to engage citizens at large with the work of the office.  
What both approaches have in common is a clear will to influence government action in a 
very directive way. Where the SPSO’s systemic work remains largely confined to improving 
complaint handling, however, the OO targets substantive administration much more clearly. It 
also seems evident form the OO’s reports that their systemic focus often involves a first 
principles review of administrative action rather than a focus only on the quality of action 
assessed against existing policies and procedures. Indeed, their reports are often supported by 
extensive research into practices in other countries and are supported by expert testimony from 
independent specialists in the areas being investigated. This seems a broader emphasis on 
improvement and catalysing change than a more traditional one which is restricted to ensuring 
the fair treatment of individuals. For both the OO and the SPSO, the systemic role and the 
importance of the ombudsman’s office are seen as an ability to shape the structures of 
government – the SPSO through its ‘design authority’ role and the Ontario Ombudsman through 
its perceived role enhancing the ‘architecture of governance’. 
In terms of assets and liabilities, a clear asset of the OO’s approach is the principled 
approach it adopts, with investigations that are robust and which result in extensive directions for 
change. There seems to be little room in the OO’s approach for pragmatic responses and fudges 
of principle. The quality of the systemic investigation process also seems high and although 
informal resolution techniques are used in low-level cases, the frequent and high profile systemic 
investigations provide a clear normative basis for the OO’s work. By conducting investigations 
of significant depth and breadth, the OO seems willing to uncover and address ‘double-loop’ 
issues, rather than focus only on ‘single loop’ matters. The direct relationship with citizens which 
the OO achieves can be seen both as an asset and a liability. On the one hand, a call for popular 
support clearly reinforces the democratic mandate of the ombudsman as an institution which is 
there to ensure the fair treatment of the individual in the context of what are often unresponsive 
political and bureaucratic systems. On the other hand, the ombudsman has often been seen as 
deriving authority from its parliamentary connection and the idea of seeking a direct popular 
mandate is potentially controversial and could lead to the politicisation of the institution. This 
also points to a potential liability, shared with the SPSO, in relation to the usurpation of functions 
of other government actors – the dynamic approach of the ombudsman and the office’s apparent 
willingness to tackle issues of political controversy in a very directive fashion is bound to lead to 
questions of legitimacy and constitutional overreach. There is also a question of effectiveness at 
stake here. While the OO believes strongly that its approach has changed government for the 
better, its more adversarial approach may well – in practice – alienate administrators and lead to 
shallow or defensive compliance, rather than a genuine commitment to change. This may 
militate against internalisation of norms and the development of better administrative judgment. 
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A summary of the different approaches adopted by the SPSO and OO is presented in the table 
below. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Figure 18.2: contrasting approaches to the ombudsman’s learning role 
 
This brief review of two different approaches to bringing about change in government 
demonstrates some of the difficulties in generalising about the ombudsman institution, 
particularly when the question is considered across jurisdictions. Different ombudsman schemes 
may take quite different approaches to their roles and in the absence of empirical evaluation of 
these approaches, it is difficult to say how effective these types of approaches are, beyond 
pointing out their theoretical assets and liabilities. Unfortunately, empirical evaluations have 
been few and far between and, where they have taken place, it is not always clear how much can 
be extrapolated from individual case studies.  
 
 
VI. DOES THE OMBUDSMAN HELP GOVERNEMNT TO LEARN: THE 
LIMITED EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
 
The chapter now turns to a review of the limited empirical data which has been gathered on the 
ombudsman’s learning role and, first, considers the methodological and conceptual challenges 
involved in empirically investigating this issue. 
 
Methodological and conceptual challenges 
 
Before examining the findings of empirical studies, it is important to consider the challenges that 
surround empirical research looking at the relationship between the ombudsman and 
government.3 Some of these challenges are conceptual. The way in which the phenomenon being 
investigated is presented, for example, varies significantly between studies; concepts used to 
describe the focus of studies include influence, impact, policy impact, control, improvement, 
transparency, learning, effects, and so on. Studies have also tried to evaluate different things: 
some have been concerned with measuring the attitude of administrators to the ombudsman, 
while others have sought to examine the impact of particular recommendations on policies and 
processes. Studies have not always been clear about the aspects of the ombudsman’s work they 
are concerned with examining: the investigation process itself, the decisions and 
recommendations of the ombudsman, work outwith investigations such as training and policy 
work, etc. The nature of the changes examined in government also varies between studies: in 
most cases, this is restricted to considering whether changes have occurred, rather than in a 
subsequent evaluation of whether those changes could be described as improvements. There is 
also a tendency in studies not to differentiate clearly between the nature of changes being 
examined: proactive, ex ante changes where the ombudsman’s future position is pre-empted, or 
reactive, ex post changes which arise in response to a particular decision. Some studies have 
                                               
3 Many of these challenges are shared with literature seeking to explore administrative responses to judicial review. 
See Sunkin (2004).  
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focused solely on the approach of the ombudsman, for example, looking at whether decisions are 
norm-producing or whether systemic investigations have been used more frequently.4  
Methodologically, there is broad consensus in the literature about the challenge of 
quantifying the effects of the ombudsman, especially outwith individual cases. Even within the 
individual case, given that a core goal of the ombudsman is to improve the fairness of 
administration, and that this concept is both nebulous and difficult to measure, empirical enquiry 
is a complex endeavor. As already discussed above, the role plurality and ambiguity of the 
ombudsman is an added challenge in operationalizing research. Timing is another important 
methodological challenge, with most studies measuring responses of government to the 
ombudsman at a single point in time, rather than longitudinally. The sustainability of change and 
learning is rarely addressed (Steyvers and Reynart 2009). Even where clear changes in 
administrative practice can be identified through research, scholars are likely to be left with 
difficulties establishing causality, particularly given the increasingly complex and multi-level 
nature of modern government. Overall, conclusions presented by authors often depend on the 
expectations of researchers or on the implicit or explicit basis on which evaluations are being 
made. For example, one author is impressed by the European Ombudsman’s fairly lackluster 
compliance record because of a belief that compliance is less likely without enforcement powers 
(Kostadina, 2015). Finally, studies have tended to use either qualitative or quantitative methods, 
but in both cases have tended to rely predominantly on data reported by bureaucrats themselves. 
Few studies have been able to gain access to administrative records or been able to conduct 
sustained observation of bureaucratic responses. The expense, ethical challenges, and difficulty 
in securing access for such research mean that the quality of the evidence gathered in studies has 
tended to be of largely exploratory value.  
 
The findings of empirical studies 
 
Beginning with research which has produced more pessimistic or at least ambivalent findings, 
Hill (1972) conducted the first empirical study seeking to evaluate the effect of ombudsman 
schemes on public administration. He investigated the reactions of senior civil servants in New 
Zealand to the New Zealand Ombudsman. His findings indicate that although administrators and 
the ombudsman shared a congruent and mutually reinforcing set of values, most considered that 
the ombudsman had little impact on their work: 68 per cent said the ombudsman had no impact 
on administration, while 32 per cent said it had some and had made them more careful.  
Gregory and Hutchesson (1975) conducted a small scale empirical enquiry as part of a 
broader piece of research looking at the UK’s Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration 
(PCA).  They found that the creation of the PCA in 1967 had not led to any changes in the 
attitudes of central government administrators and that, although changes to procedures and 
administrative systems had been brought about, these were peripheral. Gill (2012), meanwhile, 
conducted a small-sample study of the ex ante impact of the Scottish Public Services 
Ombudsman on the decision-making of local authority housing departments. He found that 
administrators showed little detailed awareness of the ombudsman’s rulings and that 
commitment to learning from the work of the ombudsman was variable.5 Recognising the limited 
nature of the study and that its findings were less positive than a number of others, Gill 
                                               
4 The summary of findings below only considers studies which have examined government responses to the 
ombudsman. 
5 This study was carried out before the reforms to the SPSO discussed earlier in this chapter. 
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nonetheless suggested a need for greater caution in assessing the claims made about the impact 
of ombudsman schemes, because many of the barriers that affect the ability of judicial review to 
control administrative action were also likely to affect ombudsman schemes. Steyvers and 
Reynart’s (2009) study of the impact of the Ghent Ombudsman, sought to assess the 
ombudsman’s influence on government through reputational analysis, whereby citizens were 
asked to assess the extent to which government was responsive to the ombudsman. They found 
that the vast majority of citizens did not feel able to provide a view on this. While this highlights 
a clear limitation in using reputational analysis to investigate how government responds to the 
ombudsman, the finding is nonetheless interesting in highlighting the fact that citizens seem to 
know relatively little about the ombudsman’s learning role. 
Turning to studies that have resulted in more upbeat findings, Friedmann (1976) 
researched the impact of the Alberta Ombudsman on public services and found that, while the 
ombudsman was rarely in the minds of administrators as they conducted their day-to-day work, 
attitudes to the ombudsman scheme were very positive. Overall, Friedmann concluded that given 
the positive attitudes of officials toward the ombudsman, it was likely to have a considerable 
ability to influence public administration. Hertogh’s (2001) research explored the impact of the 
administrative courts and the ombudsman in the Netherlands. His findings in relation to the 
ombudsman suggested that its cooperative approach helped to reduce the barriers to 
administrators making changes to policies and procedures. His concluding hypothesis was that 
the ombudsman’s collaborative style of control was likely to reduce the policy tension which 
interfered with the ability of ombudsman decisions to be implemented. Interestingly, Pajuoja 
(2009) – in a study looking at the impact of the Finish Ombudsman – also found a very high 
level of influence, but in that case it was ascribed to the ombudsman’s strong powers of coercion, 
which included criminal prosecution. In a sign that ombudsman schemes themselves are 
becoming more interested in their impact, two studies have now been commissioned by 
ombudsman schemes. The first, commissioned by the UK’s Parliamentary and Health Services 
Ombudsman, examined the impact of 21 decisions which had led to adverse findings and 
recommendations (IFF 2010). This study concluded that individual recommendations did lead to 
change, although the study noted that the timeliness of investigations, some lack of clarity in 
recommendations, and the absence of a more cooperative approach, militated against impact in 
some cases. The second commissioned study, conducted on behalf of the Toronto Ombudsman, 
reported similarly positive findings (Steimatycki et al 2015). This study found that the 
ombudsman had had an ‘overwhelming positive impact’ on municipal administration. A 
particular area where administrators reported that the ombudsman had led to improvements was 
in terms of the way administrators communicated with members of the public and in the 
treatment of vulnerable citizens.   
Three further recent studies have been conducted in a European context. Kostadina 
(2015) researched the influence of the European Ombudsman on the European Commission. She 
found that in the majority of cases, the ombudsman’s recommendations were accepted and that 
the Commission was willing to learn from the ombudsman. While Kostadina’s findings are 
clearly positive, it is notable that the rate of compliance of the European Ombudsman’s 
recommendations is poor compared with that achieved by UK public service ombudsman 
schemes. Hossu and Karp (2013) studied the administrative perceptions of the Romanian 
Ombudsman, finding generally positive views of the ombudsman and its influence. 
Administrators here reported that the ombudsman had ‘very much’ influenced their future 
activity even though they found it difficult to highlight specific changes arising from cases. 
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Finally, Von Acker and his colleagues (2015) conducted a comparative study of the role of 
ombudsman schemes and audit bodies in generating and sustaining administrative innovation in 
a number of European countries, including the UK. This study’s overall conclusion was that the 
recommendations of ombudsman schemes were effective in driving sustainable innovations in 
organisations. 
 
Assessing the empirical literature 
 
As the above summary has shown, our current empirical knowledge of government responses to 
the ombudsman is limited. Existing studies provide some support for those who emphasise the 
ombudsman’s theoretical assets in helping government to learn. Most studies seem to show that 
when asked about the work of particular ombudsman schemes, government officials respond 
positively. There certainly does not appear to be much evidence of widespread disregard or 
rejection of the ombudsman’s work. Where studies have reached more pessimistic findings, a 
lack of influence on the part of the ombudsman seems to be ascribed either to low awareness of 
the ombudsman’s work or a sense that it is somewhat peripheral to routine administration. While 
these studies make helpful individual contributions, in aggregate they are a significant way off 
providing a robust evidence base and they do not allow for strong conclusions to be drawn about 





Assessing the ombudsman’s role in helping government to learn is not straightforward. The role 
itself is a contested one and the extent to which it should be pursued remains a matter for debate. 
There are also theoretical questions over the suitability of the ombudsman in helping government 
learn: the institution has some undoubted assets, but also a number of potential liabilities. These 
questions are exacerbated once one starts to consider these issues on a global basis. The huge 
variety in approaches to the ombudsman’s role mean that generalization about the ombudsman’s 
ability to engender learning in government is inherently problematic. The examples of the 
Scottish Public Services Ombudsman and the Ontario Ombudsman demonstrate the quite 
different approaches that may be adopted, even where learning is a shared ambition of both 
institutions.  
While the small number of empirical studies concerned with examining how government 
responds to the ombudsman make a helpful contribution to a literature that is largely normative 
and descriptive in nature, these studies often raise as many questions as they answer. The 
significant conceptual and methodological challenges inherent in conducting empirical work 
mean that the findings of studies must be treated with a certain amount of caution. There is not 
currently a significant evidence base to draw on and, given the challenges involved in conducting 
such empirical studies, it is not surprising that relatively few have been carried out. The current 
position remains one of significant empirical ignorance. 
It is also not clear – in relation to both the theoretical and empirical ombudsman literature 
– that sufficient notice has been taken of work carried out in the fields of public administration 
and organisational science, which problematizes the possibility of governmental learning. The 
significant barriers to learning and change in government, and the difficulty of principals 
exercising control over bureaucratic agents, suggests that even where bureaucrats have positive 
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attitudes to the ombudsman, meaningful change is likely to be difficult to achieve. These issues 
tend to be either ignored or significantly underestimated in existing literature. 
How can the current situation be remedied and how can we improve our understanding of 
the ombudsman’s learning role? This chapter ends with two suggestions. Firstly, ombudsman 
schemes should collect and publish better data in relation to the learning that their work 
engenders. In the same way that policies are routinely evaluated, ombudsman schemes should 
seek to evaluate on an ongoing basis the effects of their interventions, whether these relate to 
investigations, issuing guidance, providing training, or any other activity which aims at 
prompting a learning response from government. There is a role here not only for individual 
ombudsman schemes but for ombudsman membership bodies, so that data begins to be published 
in ways that allow for some comparison across jurisdictions. This will also require cooperation 
from government, which would need to be more open and transparent in the data it makes 
available.6 
Secondly, primary academic research can play a role in helping to build our empirical 
knowledge. Particular areas where further research might be helpful include cross-jurisdictional 
studies and comparative work examining different ombudsman approaches to the learning role. It 
would, for example, be fascinating to compare the SPSO and the OO approaches discussed 
earlier in this chapter. Studies should also aim, insofar as it is possible, to draw on a fuller range 
of methodologies, using both qualitative and quantitative approaches, wherever possible seeking 
not only to study what government and ombudsman actors say they do but also gathering other 
triangulating data. Finally, studies should seek not only to measure whether learning takes place, 
but should seek to adopt theory building approaches which help explain when and how learning 
is achieved. This approach has been adopted by some of the leading work in the field to date, but 
has yet to be followed up.7 It is important that future work should develop existing theory-
building work and explicitly connect with established theoretical frameworks concerned with 
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Potential Assets Potential Liabilities 
 
Inquisitorial powers Contested role 
 
Own initiative powers Constitutional uncertainty  
 
Power to recommend Informal resolution/ settlement approaches 
 
Flexible and broad standards A lack of principled approach 
 










Not all have own initiative powers 
Suited to polycentric problems 
 





 SPSO OO 
Control tools  Quasi-regulatory Systemic investigation 
 
Stance to government Collaborative, low conflict Adversarial, high conflict 
 
Source of legitimacy Relationship with bureaucrats Relationship with citizens 
 
Media style Low media profile High media profile 
 
Main focus Complaint handling processes Substantive policy 
 
Training Public servants Other ombudsman schemes 
 
 
